Torts by Jennings, David G.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 21 
Issue 4 Survey of South Carolina Law Article 14 
1969 
Torts 
David G. Jennings 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennings, David G. (1969) "Torts," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 21 : Iss. 4 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/14 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 




The Supreme Court of South Carolina moved this state into
the mainstream of products liability law in Aickle v. Blackmon.1
The court held that the manufacturer of an automobile has a
duty of care in design to minimize the risk of death or serious
injury to occupants of the car in the event of collision. The
court, in this far-reaching decision, also held that the jury
could find the manufacturer liable for damages resulting from
defective material placed in the automobile thirteen years prior
to the accident.
The plaintiff was injured in May, 1962, when the 1949 Ford
in which she was riding collided with an automobile driven by
Blackmon. She was impaled upon the gearshift lever, which
penetrated her spine, about breast level, causing complete and
permanent paralysis of her body below the point of injury. In
this suit against Blackmon, Cherokee [Construction Company],
Inc., and Ford Motor Co., the jury found actual damages against
Cherokee of $468,000 and against Ford of $312,000, but the trial
court granted Ford's motion for judgment non obstante vere-
dicto.
In affirming the judgment against Cherokee, 2 the court held
that the jury was justified in concluding that the risk created by
Cherokee - that two automobiles would enter the intersection,
each driver thinking that he had the right-of-way - was realized
because of Cherokee's negligent failure to guard against it. The
jury could also find a causal connection between such negligence
and the plaintiff's injuries.
The most important aspect of this case concerns the reasoning
used by the court in reversing the judgment for Ford. The
court first had to decide whether the manufacturer owed a duty
of care in design to minimize the risk of death or serious injury
in case of collision.
1. 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969). The case is carefully considered in Com-
ment, Products Liability-Duty of Care in Automobile Design-Fitness for
Collision, 21 S.C.L. Rav. 451 (1969).
2. Cherokee, Inc., a construction company, was widening Black Street and
had removed the stop sign controlling traffic on Black. The Mickle automo-
bile was traveling on Jones Street which the driver knew to be a through
street. Blackmon, who was unfamiliar with the area and did not know that
Jones Street was the favored highway, saw no stop sign. He proceeded into
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The only two appellate decisions in which this issue has been
decided reached opposite conclusions. The South Carolina court
struck a major blow for the consumer, adopting the rationale of
Larsen v. GeneraZ Motors Corp. :3
Where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes
an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its
products, the manufacturer should be liable for the
injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care
in the design. These injuries are readily foreseeable as
an incident to the normal and expected use of an auto-
mobile. While automobiles are not made for the purpose
of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevitable
contingency of normal automobile use will result in
collisions and injury-producing impacts. No rational
basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where
the defect in design or manufacture was the causative
factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting
injury, usually caused by the so-called "second collision"
of the passenger with the interior part of the automo-
bile, all are foreseeable. Where the injuries or enhanced
injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure to use rea-
sonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its products
to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence
principles should be applicable .... 4
Having established Ford's duty, the court held that the issue
of Ford's negligence could be submitted to the jury under com-
mon law principles. The jury could reasonably find that Ford
should have foreseen the danger in this gearshift lever knob,
which defects in design caused to deteriorate upon exposure to
sunlight and shatter upon impact with a hard object.
Ford contended that there was no defect in the knob when the
automobile left the manufacturer's hands and that Ford was not
liable for any injury caused by the deterioration of the knob
after thirteen years' use. Mr. Justice Brailsford replied that
neither a long-continued lapse of time nor any change in owner-
ship was sufficient standing alone to defeat recovery when there
3. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (judgment for plaintiff); cf. Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) (judgment for defendant).
4. Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E2d 173, 186 (S.C. 1969) quoting Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Ford Motor
Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) and Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.,
308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (cited by the court).
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was clear evidence of an original defect in the product sold.5
The supreme court, therefore, reversed Ford's judgment %on
obstante veredicto but remanded the case for a new trial because
of several erroneous instructions concerning the duty of the
manufacturer. 6
A trend toward requiring greater care and responsibility from
marnufacturers is reflected in this decision. This case, by widen-
ing the scope of the manufacturer's duty, stands in the forefront
of this movement.
II. PROXIMATE CAUSE
In Ro millat v. KeZler7 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
showed its recent tendency to use the "but for" rule in connection
with proximate cause, although such a rule is more appropriate
to causation-in-fact than to proximate cause. The plaintiff was
injured when the defendant Selvey's automobile drove into the
opposing lane of traffic and struck the automobile driven by the
defendant Keller, which then traveled 105 yards before striking
head-on the automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger."
Keller's speed was not the proximate cause of the collision with
the Selvey automobile. However, the court held that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that but for its excessive
speed Keller's automobile could have been so controlled in a
distance of 105 yards as to avoid the collision. The facts sup-
ported the inference, apparently drawn by the jury, that the
momentum generated by the unlawful speed deprived Keller of
the ability to control his vehicle in a reasonable manner.9
The court in Zorn v. Crawford'0 again dealt with proximate
cause, using the "but for" rule as its guiding principle. Diane
Zorn, age 15, was killed when the automobile in which she was
riding collided with one driven by Sanders." The court found
5. See also W. PRoSSER, HANmOOK OF THE LAW oF TORTS § 96, at 667
(3rd ed. 1964). See also Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F2d 673 (10th
Cir. 1958) (cited by the court).
6. 166 S.E.2d at 191-93.
7. 167 S.F_2d 425 (S.C. 1969).
8. At the time of the accident, Keller was driving on the proper side of
the median strip at 60-65 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone.
9. The plaintiff successfully relied upon the principle that a motorist has
the duty to exercise due care to control his vehicle even though it was wrong-
fully set in motion by the impact of another vehicle. See 2 D. BLAsHEELD,
AUTroM oB LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 105.8, at 322 (3rd ed. 1965).
10. 165 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 1969).
11. The collision occurred when Sanders suddenly veered into the path of
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that the evidence supported a finding of negligence on the part
of Crawford's employee, driving a tractor without lights or
improperly lighted in violation of Section 46-512 of the South
Carolina Code. It was therefore reasonably inferable that, but
for the failure of the defendant and his employee to have proper
lights, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the rear could
have ascertained the tractor's presence on the highway in time to
have avoided the collision.12 Such nonobservance of the statute
by the defendant was properly considered a proximate cause of
the death of plaintiff's intestate, because the accident was of the
type intended to be prevented by observance of the statute.'3
Despite finding that the defendant's statutory violation was
negligence per se and the proximate cause of the accident, the
court remanded the case since the $250,000 awarded was exces-
sive.
In Fowler v. Coastal Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,'- a three-year
old child complained of stomach pains three or four minutes
after drinking from a newly opened bottle of Coca-Cola. A
foreign substance was discovered in the same bottle one and one-
half hours later. The child was ill during the night and was
taken to the doctor the next morning.15 The hospital pathologist
who examined the bottle determined that it contained a form of
yeast.'6
In reversing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
court stated that although a violation of the Pure Food and
Drug Act, Sections 32-1511 to -1525 of the 1962 Code, is negli-
gence per se,17 it would not support a recovery for damages
unless such violation proximately caused the injury.'8 Where, as
in this case, the cause of plaintiff's injury may as reasonably
be attributed to an act for which the defendant is not liable as
defendant Crawford's improperly lighted farm tractor. The court noted that
the fact that the negligence of Sanders may have contributed to the collision
did not relieve Crawford of liability if his negligence was a concurring proxi-
mate cause of the accident.
12. 165 S.E.2d at 643.
13. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S.C. 267, 37 S.E.2d 737 (1946).
14. 167 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 1969).
15. Dr. Howard Smith testified that at the time in question, there was a
rash of virus attacks among children in the community. He said that a virus
was the most likely cause of the child's illness.
16. The pathologist testified that where a bottle of Coca-Cola had been
opened sixteen hours before, any sugar solution therein would support a
growth of yeast and that from what he had observed the yeast could have
developed between the time the bottle was opened and the time he examined it.
17. Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641
(1940) .
18. Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324 (1948).
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4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/14
TORTS SURVEYED
to one for which he is liable, the plaintiff has failed to carry the
burden of establishing that his injury was proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence.19
The decision in Gossett v. Burnett20 is important because the
Supreme Court of South Carolina has placed itself in a position
to answer, for the first time, the question: "[T]o what extent,
if any, and under what circumstances may a party, who wrong-
fully sets off a false emergency alarm, be held liable for injury
or damage caused to a third person by acts of one responding
to the false alarm."
2 1
The supreme court, in reversing the trial court, which had
sustained the defendant bank's demurrer to the complaint,
22
stated that the issue of whether the conduct of the driver of the
police car was foreseeable by the bank could be decided only in
light of the evidence produced at trial.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Littlejohn stated that
the court should provide some guidance for the court which must
try the case. He felt that one should not be held liable if there
is nothing more than simple negligence, but one who intention-
ally gives a false alarm has, through his own misconduct, set
the stage and should be held accountable for all injuries proxi-
mately caused by his action. The demurrer, therefore, should
have been overruled; willfulness was alleged against the bank.
III. Rss IPSA LoQuT= in SouT CAEOLiNA.
In Jones v. DagU23 the court used a principle very similar to
res ipsa loquitur to support a finding of recklessness.2 4 Indeed
19. Messier v. Adicks, 251 S.C. 268, 161 S.E2d 845 (1968).
20. 164 S.E.2d 578 (S.C. 1968).
21. Id. at 579.
22. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant bank negligently and willfully
set off a false burglar alarm. The defendant Lewis, a policeman, was sent to
answer the alarm and collided with the vehicle driven by Burnett, which caused
Lewis' vehicle to collide with a vehicle driven by McAllister, knocking the
McAllister vehicle into the stationary automobile occupied by the plaintiff.
The complaint further alleged that Lewis was negligent in running a red
light and failing to warn of his intention to do so. The defendant bank de-
murred, on the grounds that its act of setting off the false alarm was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that such was caused by the
intervening and superseding acts of the defendants Lewis and Burnett, which
the bank could not reasonably have foreseen.
23. 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969).
24. A car owned by one defendant and being driven by his seventeen-year-
old son, also a defendant, went off the road onto the right shoulder of a
long sweeping curve to the left After traveling 228 feet, the driver abruptly
turned to the left to get back onto the pavement, but the automobile turned
over, causing the death of the plaintiff's fifteen-year-old daughter who was a
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the principle is so similar that one wonders why the court con-
tinues to deny that res ipsa loquitur is a part of the law of South
Carolina.25 In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the
court held that, although there was no direct evidence of negli-
gence, circumstantial evidence justified the inference that the
accident was due to the driver's recklessness in approaching the
curve at an excessive rate of speed and without having the
automobile under proper control.
The court also held, with respect to the driver's alleged in-
experience, that the standard of care by which the conduct of the
driver was to be judged was that of a reasonably prudent man
under the same or similar circumstances. 26 This standard applies
in South Carolina regardless of the driver's experience in operat-
ing the automobile, and regardless of whether the question is
one of ordinary negligence or of recklessness under the Guest
Statute.27 The jury, therefore, was correctly instructed that the
driver is not excused from liability for injuries caused by him as
a result of his inexperience.
28
The court rejected the view that the mere failure of the de-
ceased to use seat belts constituted negligence or a failure to
minimize damages. No evidence indicated that the failure of the
deceased to fasten the seat belt contributed in any way to the
occurrence of the accident, nor was it shown that she would not
have been injured in the same manner if the seat belt had been
fastened. 20
In Br own 'v. Ford Motor Co.30 the plaintiffs relied solely on
the theory of res ipsa Zoquitur. The car in which they were
riding went out of control and crashed into a bridge. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the accident and the resulting injuries and
damages were due to the malfunctioning of a defective steering
mechanism installed negligently and in violation of the defen-
25. The dissenting opinion of Acting Associate Justice Weatherford in
Orr v. Saylor, - S.E.2d-(S.C. 1969), decided after the end of the survey
period, examines this issue in detail.
26. The defendant had cited the principle, applied in several jurisdictions,
that the extent of the motorist's duty to his guest is to exercise only such
skill and judgment as he possesses. See Annot., 43 A.L.R2d 1155 (1955) ; 5D
BLASHFIELD, AuTomonIE LAW AND PRACTICE § 213.46 (3rd ed. 1966) ; 60 C.J.S.
Motor Vehicles § 402 (1969).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
28. See 5D B.AsrFIEo, AUroMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 103.1 and 103.2,
(3rd ed. 1965). 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 264 (1949).
29. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967).
30. 287 F. Supp. 906 (D.S.C. 1968).
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dant's warranties. However, there was no evidence of Ford's
negligence, except the very fact of the accident.31
In granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment, 2
the court noted that although South Carolina law generally up-
holds "the liability of a car manufacturer for injuries sustained
as a result of a defect in the car's installed mechanism or con-
struction, a plaintiff's right of recovery may not rest on the
presumption arising from the mere accident itself or any doc-
trine of res ipsa loguitur.133 The right of recovery must be based
upon proof, either direct or circumstantial, that there was a
defect and that it was reasonably probable that such defect
was the cause of the injuries. Here the record was devoid of
any specification of a defect in the apparatus alleged to be
defective. Therefore the proof of the defect and its causal rela-
tion to the accident amounted to mere speculation and thus would
not, as a matter of law, support the cause of action.
IV. MALPRACTICE
In Steeves v. United States,34 Robert Steeves, eleven years of
age, was taken to the Air Force Dispensary on July 21 com-
plaining of stomach pains. After tests one Dr. Mullins diag-
nosed his condition as possible appendicitis, and he was taken
to the Naval Hospital. During the next twenty-four hours there
he was seen by two doctors, one an intern, who did not think
that his condition was serious. These two refused to consult with
other doctors concerning their difference of opinion with Dr.
Mullins. On July 22, Dr. Mullins had Robert admitted to the
dispensary for more tests, and at 11:00 pm., Dr. Edwards diag-
nosed possible acute appendicitis and sent him to the emergency
room with instructions to keep his appendix from rupturing.
After several delays he was finally put to bed at the hospital
at 2:10 a.m. with an observation of possible appendicitis. Sur-
31. The testimony established that the car was eleven months old and had
been driven 16,000 miles. It had not been examined following the wreck. Its
steering mechanism was never examined. None of plaintiff's three expert
witnesses had seen the car or examined its steering mechanism. They testified
that at least twenty things could have caused the malfunctioning but affirmed
the impossibility of identifying the cause precisely.
32. "[I]ssues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary ad-
judication, but when the moving party clearly establishes that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, a summary judgment may be rendered." 287
F. Supp. at 909, quoting Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 273 F2d 572 (4th
Cir. 1960).
33. 287 F. Supp. at 910 (footnotes omitted).
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gery began at 10:28 a.m. on July 23, and the appendix was found
ruptured. As a result of complications stemming from the rup-
ture, the plaintiff's medical expert expressed the opinion, with
which the court agreed, that the boy had suffered a 5% impair-
ment of the whole person.
The court stated that a doctor is bound to use reasonable care
in the treatment of patients and the rendering of professional
services, but he must only possess and exercise that degree of
skill which is ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of
the profession who are in good standing in the general neighbor-
hood.-1s In light of certain established medical principles,30 the
court, without a jury, held that in light of Dr. Mullins' diagnosis
the failure on the part of the other doctors to seek consultations
and the failure to keep the plaintiff for observation was a
breech of good medical practice, negligence, and the proximate
cause of the rupture of the plaintiff's appendix and resulting
damage. Judgment was for the plaintiff.
V. SLIPS AND FALLS
In this day of the self-service market and department store,
the plaintiff who has slipped on something in the aisle must
bear a very heavy burden of proof in order to recover for his
injuries.
In Pennington v. Zayre Corp.3 7 the plaintiff fell injuring
herself in the defendant's store when her foot slipped on a trans-
parent plastic bag.38 The court, in affirming the trial court's
35. See Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (cited by the
court).
36. A child is owed a greater duty of care by a hospital than is an adult.
Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966). When
appendicitis is suspected, the only adequate remedy is surgery; and, because
of the consequences of a rupture, it is dangerous to delay. It is, therefore,
better to remove a sound appendix than to delay and allow rupture and
gangrene. Rogers v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ohio, 1963), affd
334 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1964). A greater degree of diligence, as the circum-
stances permit, is imposed upon a doctor in making a diagnosis where other
competent doctors have previously made a positive diagnosis in direct conflict
with that of the doctor in question. 41 A.m. Jura Physicians and Surgeons
§ 92, at 210 (1942).
37. 165 S.E.2d 695 (S.C. 1969).
38. It has long been recognized in South Carolina that a merchant is not the
insurer of the safety of his customers but must use ordinary care to keep
the premises in reasonably safe condition. Gilliland v. Pierce Motor Co., 235
S.C. 268, 111 S.E.2d 521 (1959); Anderson v. Belk-Robinson Co., 192 S.C.
132, 5 S.E.2d 732 (1939). To prove negligence the plaintiff is required to
show either that the material causing the fall was placed on the floor through
an agency of the store or that the merchant had actual or constructive notice
[Vol. 21
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decision to grant the defendant's motion for an involuntary
nonsuit, felt that there was no evidence that the bags were on the
floor at any time prior to the fall and therefore no proof that
the bag had been there sufficiently long for the merchant to be
negligent in failing to discover it.
IiMmberly v. Winn-Dx-le Green ,ille, Inc.,39 was based on facts
similar to those in Pennington.40 In reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff, the court held that no evidence reasonably tended to
prove that the rice was on the floor at any particular time prior
to the actual fall, and that the jury could not speculate that the
rice had been on the floor for such a length of time that the
defendant was negligent in failing to discover and remove it.
Mr. Justice Bussey, dissenting, noted that negligence could
be proved by circumstantial evidence and that constructive notice
could rarely be proved otherwise. He felt the question should
have been whether the jury could reasonably infer that the de-
fendant, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known
of the rice on the floor.
41
In Joye v. A & p42 the court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff who slipped on a banana, on the grounds of insufficient
evidence4 3 to present a jury question as to constructive notice.
The principles applied in these three cases were formulated
in an era of small stores, closely supervised by their proprietors.
The modern supermarket, by contrast, is invariably either self-
of the presence of the material on the floor and failed to remove it. "Con-
structive notice may be proved by showing that the material had been on
the floor sufficiently long that the defendant was negligent in failing to
discover and remove it." Pennington v. Zayre Corp., 165 S.E.2d 695, 696
(S.C. 1969), cifing Hunter v. Dixie Homes Stores, 232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d
262 (1957).
39. 165 S.E.2d 627 (S.C. 1969).
40. The plaintiff slipped on rice on the floor of the defendant's store. The
floor had been swept at 8:00 a.m., and the fall occurred between 10:00 a.m. and
11:00 a.m. There had been many customers in the store before the plaintiff's
fall. Several employees stated that they had seen no rice on the floor prior to
the fall, but the store had a variegated floor, upon which rice would be difficult
to detect.
41. It appeared to justice Bussey from the evidence that the rice was not
dropped only a moment before the fall by another customer. He felt that a
reasonable inference from the evidence was that no other customers were in
the store during the whole time that the plaintiff was there. 165 S.E.2d at
630-31.
42. 405 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1968).
43. The evidence shows that the floor had not been swept for perhaps
thirty-five minutes before the plaintiff's fall and that no one saw the banana
peel before the fall. The peel was described as being dark brown in color,
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service or minimally staffed with sales personnel. The customer
thus is often the only person handling the merchandise until he
checks out of the store.
This change in merchandising technique seems to call for a
reconsideration of the law in this area, given the plaintiff's
difficulty in establishing constructive notice. Imposing a more
stringent duty of inspection on the merchant, thus easing the
plaintiff's burden of proof, might well be in order.
DAVI G. JENNNGcs
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